Table of Contents

Data compiled April 2026. BLS employment data through March 2026; wage data through February or March 2026 depending on NAICS subset. Industry data from the 2025 SIA Factbook and the SIA-Oxford Economics “Chipping Away” study. CHIPS Act data through July 2025 per GAO-26-107882, with Department of Commerce announcements through August 2025 incorporated. This report draws on sources with different scopes and reporting periods.

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Executive Summary

The U.S. semiconductor workforce is shrinking, but the demand for new workers is growing. The number of people working in semiconductor and electronic component manufacturing has dropped from a peak of about 401,000 in 2023 to 368,400 as of March 2026. At the same time, CHIPS Act-funded fab projects under construction represent the biggest planned expansion of U.S. chip-making capacity in decades.

The real problem is not a shortage of workers in general. It is a shortage of the right skills. The SIA-Oxford Economics study projects the industry needs to add 115,000 jobs by 2030. About 67,000 of those jobs are at risk of going unfilled. Higher pay alone will not close this gap. The roles in shortest supply — process engineers, equipment technicians, and skilled operators — require specific degrees, vendor training, and 18 to 36 months of on-the-job experience. None of that can be created quickly.

The funding picture has also gotten harder to predict. Of the $30.9 billion in CHIPS Act funding awarded as of July 2025, $5.7 billion of unpaid Intel grants was converted into a federal equity stake in August 2025 (combined with $3.2 billion from the separate Secure Enclave defense program, for an $8.9 billion total equity investment representing a 9.9 percent stake). Another $7.4 billion in research funding to Natcast was canceled the same month. Construction at major fab projects continues, but the rules around federal funding are still being rewritten.

For semiconductor employers, three things follow:

• Plan for multiple scenarios, not one forecast. Policy, supply chains, and trade dynamics are all in motion. Hiring plans built on a single set of assumptions will not hold up.
• Plan project by project, not policy by policy. Some funded fabs are hiring now. Others are years from hiring. A few may be restructured again. Treat each project on its own timeline.
• Build the pipeline now for hiring in 2028 and beyond. Community college programs, university partnerships, and apprenticeships take years to produce qualified workers. The investment has to start before the demand peaks.

Semiconductor manufacturing sits within the broader U.S. manufacturing workforce, which faces its own set of structural challenges covered in detail in Amtec’s manufacturing workforce report.

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At a Glance: Semiconductor Workforce Benchmarks

368,400 – U.S. workers in semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing (NAICS 3344), seasonally adjusted, March 2026 preliminary. Down from a 2023 peak of approximately 401,000. Source: BLS Current Employment Statistics.

345,000 – Direct jobs in the U.S. semiconductor industry (industry-defined scope, includes manufacturing and design). Source: SIA 2025 Factbook, citing SIA-Oxford Economics analysis.

~115,000 – Projected new U.S. semiconductor industry jobs by 2030 across manufacturing and design. Source: SIA-Oxford Economics, “Chipping Away,” July 2023.

~67,000 – Of those projected new jobs, the share at risk of going unfilled at current education and training pipeline rates. Source: SIA-Oxford Economics, July 2023.

$30.9 billion – CHIPS Act direct funding awarded across 40 projects to 19 companies as of July 2025, plus $5.5 billion in loans. Source: GAO-26-107882, December 2025.

$57.78/hour – Average hourly earnings, semiconductor and related device manufacturing (NAICS 334413), February 2026. Source: BLS CES Table B-3a.

1. Industry Overview

The U.S. semiconductor industry is one of the most strategically significant manufacturing sectors in the American economy. U.S.-headquartered firms held 50.4 percent of global semiconductor market share in 2024, the largest position of any country’s semiconductor industry. U.S. firm sales reached $318.2 billion in 2024, up 20 percent from the prior year. Globally, semiconductor sales reached $630.5 billion in 2024 and grew 25.6 percent to $791.7 billion in 2025, with WSTS projecting annual global sales of approximately $975 billion in 2026, driven significantly by AI-related demand.

Semiconductors were the sixth-largest U.S. export in 2024 at $57.0 billion, ranking behind only refined oil, aircraft, crude oil, natural gas, and automobiles, and constituting the largest electronic product export.

For workforce planners, the relevant context is the industry’s extreme capital and R&D intensity. U.S. semiconductor firms invested $235,007 per employee in combined capital expenditures and R&D in 2024, a figure that exceeds nearly every other manufacturing sector. Total industry investment in capital and R&D reached $119.5 billion in 2024, with R&D alone accounting for $70 billion. R&D as a share of sales reached 17.6 percent in 2024, the highest of any country’s semiconductor industry and second only to U.S. pharmaceuticals and biotechnology among major U.S. industries.

This capital and R&D intensity has direct workforce planning implications. Semiconductor manufacturing roles are not interchangeable with general manufacturing roles; the productivity per worker is higher, the equipment they operate is more expensive, the failure cost of errors is greater, and the engineering content of routine production work is substantially elevated. A semiconductor manufacturing technician is closer in skill profile to a junior process engineer than to a comparable production worker in food, automotive, or fabricated metal manufacturing.

Sales per employee in U.S. semiconductor firms reached $744,312 in 2024, more than double the 2001 level. This productivity trajectory is part of why headcount can decline while output grows, a dynamic that distinguishes semiconductor workforce planning from most other manufacturing sectors.

2. Current Workforce Size and Trajectory

Two distinct figures describe the U.S. semiconductor workforce, and the difference between them matters for accurate planning.

BLS Current Employment Statistics, NAICS 3344 (semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing): 368,400 workers in March 2026, seasonally adjusted, preliminary. February 2026: 368,700. January 2026: 369,400. The workforce peaked at approximately 401,000 in early 2023 and has declined steadily since. This figure captures manufacturing employment in the broader electronic component category, of which semiconductor manufacturing is a subset.

SIA industry-defined workforce: 345,000 direct jobs in the U.S. semiconductor industry, per the SIA 2025 Factbook citing the SIA-Oxford Economics “Chipping Away” report. This figure captures the industry as the SIA defines it, which includes semiconductor design firms (typically classified outside NAICS 3344) and excludes some non-semiconductor electronic components within NAICS 3344. The SIA estimates each direct semiconductor job supports approximately 5.7 indirect jobs in the broader U.S. economy, implying nearly 2 million additional jobs supported.

These two figures measure overlapping but distinct workforces. Throughout this report, the BLS NAICS 3344 figure is used for headline workforce size and trajectory, because it represents current monthly federal data and is the figure most consistently cited in employment analysis. The SIA industry-defined figure is referenced where projections, industry economics, or design-inclusive scope is at issue.

The trajectory is the most important point. The conventional 2023 to 2024 narrative described the U.S. semiconductor workforce as growing in response to CHIPS Act tailwinds. The current data does not support that framing. Headcount has declined for nearly two years from the 2023 peak. The decline is consistent across monthly BLS releases and is not an artifact of seasonal adjustment.

The decline does not mean hiring has stopped. Across 2024 and 2025, semiconductor employers continued to hire actively while net headcount fell, reflecting elevated voluntary turnover, retirements, and selective consolidation within larger firms. The aggregate number understates hiring volume substantially.

3. The Skills Gap and Pipeline Constraints

The SIA-Oxford Economics analysis projects U.S. semiconductor industry employment to grow by approximately 115,000 jobs by 2030 to support both replacement demand and capacity expansion. Of those 115,000 projected new jobs, roughly 67,000 are at risk of going unfilled at current education and training pipeline rates. This projection uses SIA’s industry-defined scope (manufacturing and design) and is the most-cited workforce-gap figure in semiconductor policy and industry literature.

The composition of the projected gap is structurally significant for workforce planners:

Approximately 39 percent of the unfilled-job risk concentrates in technician roles requiring associate degrees or technical certifications, including process technicians, equipment maintenance technicians, and metrology specialists. These positions typically require two-year degrees or vendor-specific equipment certifications and have training pipelines measured in years rather than weeks.

Approximately 35 percent concentrates in roles requiring bachelor’s degrees, predominantly engineers (electrical, industrial, materials, computer hardware) and computer scientists. These workers compete across multiple technology sectors that bid aggressively for the same graduates.

Approximately 26 percent concentrates in roles requiring master’s degrees or PhDs, especially in process engineering, device physics, and advanced materials. The pipeline for these workers depends on graduate program enrollment that has been flat for years and on visa and immigration policy for international students who historically have filled a substantial share of these roles.

The skills gap is not primarily a wage problem, although wages affect it. It is a pipeline problem with binding lead times. A semiconductor process engineer is not produced in three months by raising starting salaries by 10 percent. The training pipeline involves specific undergraduate coursework, often graduate-level specialization, vendor-specific equipment certifications, and on-the-job process experience that typically takes 18 to 36 months to develop after hire.

For employers planning fab ramps tied to CHIPS-funded projects, this lag is the single most important workforce planning constraint. The workforce cannot be created on the timeline that fab construction permits.

4. Hiring Pressure and Talent Competition

Hiring pressure in semiconductor manufacturing extends beyond the headline shortfall figures. Three structural factors shape the current hiring environment.

Cross-industry competition for engineers. Semiconductor firms compete with cloud infrastructure providers, AI hardware companies, defense contractors, automotive OEMs developing advanced driver assistance systems, and aerospace firms for the same pool of electrical and computer engineers. The compensation premiums offered by AI hardware companies in 2024 and 2025, particularly for engineers with experience in chip design, verification, and validation, have measurably reduced the talent pool available to traditional semiconductor manufacturers, especially for mid-career hires. Cross-sector competition for engineers is a defining feature of the broader U.S. manufacturing workforce environment and is particularly acute in aerospace and defense hiring, where security clearance requirements add additional friction.

Vendor-specific equipment expertise. Modern fab operations depend on equipment from a small number of specialized vendors (ASML, Applied Materials, Lam Research, KLA, Tokyo Electron). Equipment maintenance technicians and process engineers often require vendor-specific certifications, training, and direct experience with particular tool generations. This creates highly localized labor markets. A technician with deep expertise on a specific lithography platform is functionally non-substitutable in the short term, regardless of how many general-purpose technicians are available in the broader labor market.

Geographic mismatch. New fab construction is concentrated in regions where the existing semiconductor labor market is small relative to announced demand. Workforce planning for these projects depends on either relocating experienced workers from established hubs (Arizona, Oregon, Texas) or training new workers locally on extended timelines. Both approaches have measurable limitations: experienced workers are often unwilling to relocate, and local training programs require years to scale to meaningful output.

The combined effect is that “the semiconductor workforce” is not a single labor market but a collection of overlapping submarkets defined by role, geography, vendor expertise, and clearance status. Aggregate workforce numbers conceal binding shortages in specific submarkets.

5. Compensation Benchmarks

Semiconductor manufacturing wages are substantially above general manufacturing averages, and within the broader computer and electronic product manufacturing category, semiconductor and related device manufacturing commands a meaningful premium.

Computer and electronic product manufacturing (NAICS 334), all employees: $49.34 per hour, March 2026 preliminary. Source: BLS CES Table B-3a.

Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing (NAICS 3344), all employees: $44.28 per hour, February 2026 preliminary. Source: BLS CES Table B-3a.

Semiconductor and related device manufacturing (NAICS 334413), all employees: $57.78 per hour, February 2026 preliminary. Source: BLS CES Table B-3a.

Note that NAICS 3344 averages below NAICS 334413 because the broader category includes lower-wage subsectors such as printed circuit assembly and other electronic components, which pull the 3344 average below the narrower NAICS 334413 (semiconductor and related device manufacturing) cut. The most recent BLS Table B-3a release shows February 2026 figures for the more granular NAICS subsets.

The NAICS 334413 figure is the narrowest cut, capturing actual semiconductor manufacturing rather than the broader electronic components category, and is the most relevant benchmark for hiring managers focused on semiconductor fab operations. At $57.78 per hour average earnings, semiconductor manufacturing wages exceed average earnings in computer and electronic products as a whole and are roughly 58 percent above the all-private-industry average of $37.38 per hour reported by BLS for the same period.

These figures represent average hourly earnings across all employees, including supervisory and salaried positions. Production worker wages are typically lower, while engineers and senior technical staff earn substantially more. Total compensation for semiconductor manufacturing workers also includes benefits structures that often exceed general manufacturing norms, particularly retirement plan matching, health benefits, and equity components for engineering and technical roles at publicly traded firms.

The capital intensity context matters for compensation framing. With $235,007 in capital expenditure and R&D investment per employee in 2024, semiconductor employers are operating equipment whose value substantially exceeds annual labor costs per worker. Wage premiums in semiconductor manufacturing reflect this capital intensity. Small variations in operator skill or process discipline have outsized effects on equipment utilization and yield.

6. CHIPS Act Implementation Status

The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 authorized $52.7 billion in semiconductor-related federal funding, of which $39 billion was specifically appropriated for semiconductor manufacturing incentives. The remainder funds research and development, workforce training, and supply chain security programs. Distinguishing among authorized, appropriated, awarded, and disbursed matters substantially for workforce planning, because announced projects do not necessarily translate to near-term hiring.

Per the December 2025 Government Accountability Office report (GAO-26-107882), as of July 2025, the Department of Commerce had awarded $30.9 billion in direct funding across 40 projects to 19 companies, plus $5.5 billion in loans to two companies. Thirteen of the 19 companies received funding for workforce development activities associated with the projects. Project completion dates span from November 2024 through October 2033. Companies had submitted milestone completion reports for 24 of 161 total milestones as of July 2025. The first project, a leading-edge logic chip manufacturing facility in Arizona, was certified as complete in June 2025. Commerce estimated that the funded projects would bring the U.S. share of global leading-edge logic chip manufacturing from 0 percent in 2022 to 20 percent by 2030.

The implementation environment has changed materially under the Trump administration, and workforce planning that ignores the policy shifts of 2025 and 2026 will overstate near-term hiring demand from CHIPS-funded projects.

In August 2025, the federal government took a 9.9 percent equity stake in Intel by purchasing 433.3 million shares at $20.47 per share, an $8.9 billion investment funded through a restructuring of previously awarded federal semiconductor funding. The $8.9 billion comprised $5.7 billion in unpaid CHIPS Act grants and $3.2 billion from the Department of Defense’s Secure Enclave program. Combined with $2.2 billion in CHIPS grants Intel had already received before the deal, total federal financial support for Intel reached $11.1 billion, though only $8.9 billion of that total was converted to equity. Trump administration officials framed the conversion as a model for additional restructuring of federal semiconductor funding agreements, indicating intent to apply similar approaches to other recipients.

Also in August 2025, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick announced that the National Institute of Standards and Technology would assume operational responsibility for the National Semiconductor Technology Center from Natcast, the nonprofit entity established under the Biden administration. The Commerce Department voided up to $7.4 billion in CHIPS R&D funding allocated to Natcast, citing alleged violations of the Government Corporation Control Act in Natcast’s establishment. NSTC operations continue under direct NIST management.

These changes do not reverse the core CHIPS framework. Direct funding awards remain in place, project milestones continue to be tracked, and construction continues at the major fab projects funded through 2024 and early 2025. But the implementation pathway is more uncertain than the original 2022 framework anticipated. Workforce planners at semiconductor employers are operating in an environment where the federal share of capacity expansion costs, the structure of remaining awards, and the pace of subsequent funding rounds are all subject to ongoing renegotiation.

For hiring managers, the practical implication is that announced workforce commitments tied to CHIPS-funded projects should be treated as project-specific and time-specific rather than as a uniform policy tailwind. Some projects (such as the Arizona leading-edge logic facility) are operational and hiring; others have multi-year construction timelines that defer hiring substantially; and some may be subject to further restructuring in 2026 or beyond.

7. External Pressures: Materials, Geopolitics, and Trade

Workforce planning in semiconductor manufacturing in 2026 is shaped by external conditions that affect demand stability, supply chain risk, and the political environment for ongoing investment. These external pressures do not directly determine hiring numbers, but they affect how confidently employers can commit to workforce expansion plans.

Materials supply chain. Semiconductor manufacturing depends on a small number of specialized inputs, including high-purity silicon, photoresists, specialty gases (helium, neon, xenon), and substrates, that are produced by a concentrated set of global suppliers. Disruptions to these supply chains affect production volumes and, by extension, near-term workforce decisions. Helium supply tightness has become a more visible risk for semiconductor manufacturers, with industry executives warning that disruptions began affecting parts of the global tech supply chain in 2025 and 2026.

Geopolitical and trade dynamics. U.S. semiconductor firms hold 50.4 percent of global market share but depend on global supply chains for equipment, materials, and customers. Export controls on semiconductor sales to China, retaliatory measures, and ongoing trade policy changes affect demand visibility. Shipments to the China market declined from 2022 onward, partly reflecting export controls. Tariff policy under the Trump administration has continued to evolve, with semiconductor-specific tariff measures and exemptions affecting both input costs and output demand.

Domestic political environment. The CHIPS Act implementation changes discussed in Section 6 are part of a broader recalibration of U.S. industrial policy toward semiconductor manufacturing. Workforce commitments made under one administration’s framework may be renegotiated under another. Employers planning multi-year workforce expansion should account for policy variability as a non-trivial planning constraint.

For workforce planners, the takeaway is not that any of these pressures will cause near-term workforce contractions, but that the planning environment is genuinely more uncertain than the 2023 narrative implied. Employers benefit from workforce plans that include scenario flexibility rather than single-point forecasts.

8. Productivity and Automation in the Workforce

Semiconductor manufacturing has become more automated over the past two decades, and the trajectory continues. This is sometimes interpreted as reducing workforce requirements; the actual pattern is more complex.

Sales per employee in U.S. semiconductor firms reached $744,312 in 2024, more than double the 2001 figure of approximately $283,000. This productivity growth has been enabled by sustained capital and R&D investment, with $119.5 billion in combined capital expenditure and R&D in 2024 alone, capex reaching $49.5 billion, and R&D reaching $70 billion.

The productivity gains have not translated into workforce contraction in proportion to output growth. Output has grown faster than headcount over the long run, but headcount has continued to grow in absolute terms across most decades. The workforce contraction visible in 2024 and 2025 reflects cyclical and structural factors specific to this period rather than a long-term automation-driven displacement.

The composition of the workforce has shifted, however. Routine production roles have declined as a share of total semiconductor employment, while engineering, process control, equipment maintenance, and software-adjacent roles have grown. A modern fab has a higher engineer-to-operator ratio than fabs of two decades ago. Equipment maintenance roles have become more technical, requiring vendor-specific expertise that did not exist in earlier generations of manufacturing equipment.

For workforce planners, the implication is that automation reduces some categories of demand while increasing others. The roles that are most automated, such as basic material handling and simple inspection, were not the binding constraint in semiconductor hiring even before automation. The roles that are growing, including process engineers, equipment specialists, and software-adjacent technicians, are precisely the roles where pipeline constraints are most severe.

9. Geographic Distribution

U.S. semiconductor manufacturing is highly concentrated geographically. Major employment and investment clusters are located in California, Oregon, Arizona, Texas, New York, Idaho, New Mexico, and Massachusetts, with expanding presence in Ohio as Intel’s Columbus-area project ramps. Specific concentration percentages vary depending on whether the measure is current employment, fab capacity, R&D activity, or announced future capacity.

Current employment is most concentrated in legacy semiconductor regions: California (especially the San Francisco Bay Area and surrounding regions), Oregon (Hillsboro, where Intel’s largest U.S. operations are located), Arizona (Phoenix and Chandler), Texas (Austin and Dallas areas), and Idaho (Boise, where Micron is headquartered).

Announced future capacity is more dispersed. CHIPS-funded projects span 21 states per Commerce Department reporting, with major new investments in Ohio (Intel), Arizona (TSMC), Texas (Samsung), New York (Micron, GlobalFoundries), and Indiana (SK hynix). The geographic spread of announced future capacity is broader than current employment, which means workforce expansion will need to occur in regions without established semiconductor labor markets.

This geographic mismatch is one of the most consequential workforce planning challenges. The states with the largest announced fab projects, including Ohio, parts of New York, and parts of Arizona, do not currently have the labor market depth to staff those fabs at full ramp without substantial training investment, relocation, or both.

10. Outlook: 2026 to 2030

The most defensible outlook for the U.S. semiconductor manufacturing workforce over the next four years incorporates the headcount trajectory, the announced demand pipeline, the policy uncertainty, and the structural constraints described above.

Headline employment in NAICS 3344 is likely to stabilize or modestly recover from current levels (368,400 as of March 2026) as CHIPS-funded projects with near-term completion dates ramp to operational hiring. The pace of recovery depends on how aggressively major recipients hire against announced commitments and on how much further restructuring occurs in CHIPS award terms.

The SIA-Oxford Economics projection of 115,000 new industry jobs by 2030 remains the most-cited estimate of the announced demand envelope, though it was modeled before the 2025 CHIPS implementation changes and likely overstates near-term realized hiring.

The 67,000 unfilled-jobs projection from the same SIA-Oxford analysis reflects pipeline constraints rather than demand-side uncertainty, and is therefore less affected by recent policy changes. Pipeline constraints, particularly for technicians, equipment specialists, and process engineers, will continue to bind regardless of how aggressively employers attempt to hire.

For semiconductor manufacturing employers, the practical workforce planning horizon should incorporate three distinct timeframes. The 12 to 24 month horizon will be shaped primarily by the pace at which existing CHIPS-funded projects ramp from construction to operations, and by employer-specific decisions on hiring intensity. The 24 to 48 month horizon will be shaped by how the policy environment continues to evolve and by how successfully training pipeline investments, both employer-led and federally-supported, scale during this period. The 48 to 72 month horizon will increasingly depend on whether the broader U.S. talent pipeline (community college technician programs, undergraduate engineering enrollment, graduate program output) responds adequately to demand, and on immigration policy affecting international talent.

11. The Future Workforce: Implications for Hiring Managers

The semiconductor manufacturing workforce of 2030 will look different from the workforce of 2026 in three ways that hiring managers should already be planning for.

Engineer-to-operator ratios will continue to shift upward. The fab of 2030 will have more engineers and process specialists per unit of output than the fab of 2026. Hiring plans built on historical operator-heavy ratios will understate engineering demand and overstate basic operator demand.

Equipment specialization will deepen. As process nodes advance and equipment becomes more sophisticated, vendor-specific expertise becomes more valuable and harder to substitute. Workforce plans should explicitly account for equipment-specific training pipelines as a separate constraint from general technical hiring.

Cross-functional capability will become more important. The boundary between traditional manufacturing technician roles and software-adjacent process control roles is blurring. Hiring plans focused exclusively on conventional manufacturing skill sets will miss demand for hybrid technical-software profiles that are increasingly valuable in modern fab operations.

For hiring managers, the practical recommendation is to build workforce plans that explicitly account for: (1) the lag between hiring decisions and operational productivity for technical roles, (2) the limited substitutability of vendor-specific equipment expertise, (3) the changing skill mix demanded by advanced process nodes, and (4) the policy uncertainty affecting CHIPS-related demand timing.

12. Key Takeaways

The U.S. semiconductor manufacturing workforce stood at 368,400 in March 2026, down from a 2023 peak of approximately 401,000. This contraction coexists with the largest pipeline of announced fab capacity expansion in decades.

The SIA industry-defined workforce of 345,000 direct jobs is projected to grow by 115,000 by 2030, with 67,000 of those new jobs at risk of going unfilled. These figures use a broader scope than BLS NAICS 3344 and should be cited with explicit scope language.

CHIPS Act implementation has changed materially under the Trump administration. As of July 2025, $30.9 billion had been awarded across 40 projects, but $5.7 billion of unpaid Intel CHIPS grants was converted to a federal equity stake in August 2025 (alongside $3.2 billion from the Secure Enclave program, for an $8.9 billion total equity investment), and $7.4 billion in Natcast funding was voided in the same month. Workforce planning should treat announced project-specific commitments as the relevant unit, not aggregate authorized funding.

Compensation in semiconductor manufacturing is substantially above general manufacturing averages, with semiconductor and related device manufacturing (NAICS 334413) averaging $57.78 per hour in February 2026. Capital intensity ($235,007 per employee in 2024) helps explain wage premiums.

Pipeline constraints, particularly for technicians, equipment specialists, and process engineers, will continue to bind regardless of demand-side policy changes. Training pipelines have multi-year lead times that cannot be compressed by short-term wage increases.

Geographic mismatch between current employment concentration and announced future capacity will require either relocation, local training investment, or both. Workforce plans for new-region projects should explicitly account for this constraint.

Methodology & Sources

This report consolidates publicly available government data and industry research to provide a comprehensive view of the U.S. semiconductor manufacturing workforce.

The report was compiled in April 2026 using the latest available data, with most federal labor market series current through March 2026 (employment) and February 2026 (granular wage data). March 2026 BLS figures are preliminary and subject to revision. CHIPS Act funding and project data reflect the December 2025 GAO report covering activity through July 2025, with Department of Commerce announcements through August 2025 incorporated.

Scope

Industry: NAICS 3344 (Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing) for current monthly employment and wage data, with reference to the SIA industry-defined semiconductor workforce (manufacturing plus design) for projections and industry-economic analysis.

Geography: United States.

Workforce: All employees, with emphasis on technician, engineering, and production roles in semiconductor fabrication.

This report uses two distinct workforce scopes throughout. Where ambiguity might arise, scope is identified explicitly in the body text.

Primary Sources

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)

Official U.S. government labor market data used for employment, wages, and trajectory analysis throughout this report. All BLS data referenced are publicly available federal datasets accessible through the linked series.

NAICS 3344 employment series: https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES3133440001

BLS programs and datasets referenced:

Current Employment Statistics (CES): employment levels and average hourly earnings, NAICS 3344 series CES3133440001, seasonally adjusted, accessed April 2026 with data through March 2026.

Table B-3a, Average Hourly and Weekly Earnings: industry-level wage data for NAICS 334 (Computer and electronic product manufacturing), NAICS 3344 (Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing), and NAICS 334413 (Semiconductor and related device manufacturing). https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb3a.htm

Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA)

Industry-defined workforce figures, market share, capital expenditure, R&D intensity, productivity, and global semiconductor sales data.

The following SIA publications were used:

2025 SIA Factbook, published May 2025. https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-SIA-Factbook-FINAL-1.pdf

Used for:

• U.S. semiconductor industry workforce (345,000 direct jobs, 5.7x indirect multiplier)
• U.S. global market share (50.4 percent in 2024)
• U.S. firm sales ($318.2 billion in 2024)
• Capital and R&D investment per employee ($235,007 in 2024)
• R&D intensity (17.6 percent of sales in 2024)
• Productivity (sales per employee of $744,312 in 2024)
• 2024 global semiconductor market size ($630.5 billion)

“Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025,” February 6, 2026. https://www.semiconductors.org/global-annual-semiconductor-sales-increase-25-6-to-791-7-billion-in-2025/

Used to update Section 1 with 2025 actual sales and the 2026 WSTS projection.

“America Faces Significant Shortage of Tech Workers in Semiconductor Industry and Throughout U.S. Economy,” July 25, 2023. https://www.semiconductors.org/america-faces-significant-shortage-of-tech-workers-in-semiconductor-industry-and-throughout-u-s-economy/

Press release for the SIA-Oxford Economics workforce study, used for inline citations of the 115,000 new jobs projection and 67,000 unfilled-jobs figure.

SIA and Oxford Economics

The underlying workforce projection study used for skills-gap analysis throughout this report.

“Chipping Away: Assessing and Addressing the Labor Market Gap Facing the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,” July 2023. https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/SIA_July2023_ChippingAway_website.pdf

This source was used to inform:

• Projected workforce growth of 115,000 jobs by 2030
• Estimated 67,000 jobs at risk of going unfilled
• Composition of the unfilled-job risk by education level (39 percent technicians, 35 percent bachelor’s-level engineers, 26 percent master’s/PhD-level)
• The skills-gap framing in Section 3

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)

CHIPS Act implementation status, including authorized vs. awarded funding, project counts, and milestone tracking.

“Semiconductors: Information on Projects Funded to Strengthen U.S. Supply Chain” (GAO-26-107882), published December 11, 2025. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107882

Used for:

• $30.9 billion in direct funding awarded across 40 projects to 19 companies as of July 2025
• $5.5 billion in loans to two companies
• 13 of 19 companies receiving workforce development funding
• Project completion dates spanning November 2024 through October 2033
• 24 of 161 milestones reported complete as of July 2025
• First project (Arizona leading-edge logic facility) certified complete June 2025

U.S. Department of Commerce

Public announcements regarding CHIPS Act implementation changes under the current administration.

“Department of Commerce Takes Action Against Biden Administration’s Mismanagement of National Semiconductor Technology Center,” August 25, 2025. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2025/08/department-commerce-takes-action-against-biden-administrations

Used to document the NIST takeover of NSTC operational responsibility from Natcast and the voiding of up to $7.4 billion in CHIPS R&D funding.

Public statements regarding the Intel equity conversion, August 2025.

Manufacturing Dive

Industry trade reporting on CHIPS Act implementation changes.

“Commerce Department cuts $7.4B CHIPS funding from Natcast,” August 27, 2025. https://www.manufacturingdive.com/news/commerce-department-cuts-7-4-billion-chips-act-funding-natcast-howard-lutnick/758561/

Used to corroborate Commerce Department reporting on the Natcast funding rescission.

Additional References

CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (H.R. 4346, Public Law 117-167). https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346

Used as the foundational statutory reference for CHIPS Act authorized funding figures.